Abstract. A general automaton model for timing-based systems is presented and is used as the context for developing a variety of simulation proof techniques for such systems. As a rst step, a comprehensive overview of simulation techniques for simple untimed automata is given. In particular, soundness and completeness results for (1) re nements, (2) forward and backward simulations, (3) forward-backward and backward-forward simulations, and (4) history and prophecy relations are given. History and prophecy relations are new and are abstractions of the history variables of Owicki and Gries and the prophecy variables of Abadi and Lamport, respectively. As a subsequent step, it is shown how most of the results for untimed automata can be carried over to the setting of timed automata. In fact, many of the results for the timed case are obtained as consequences of the analogous results for the untimed case.
Introduction
We are currently involved in a project to de ne a very general formal model for real-time and other timing-based systems. We intend that the model should provide a suitable basis for formal reasoning about timing-based systems, in particular, for veri cation of their correctness and for analysis of their complexity. It should support many di erent kinds of correctness proof techniques, including process algebraic and assertional methods. So far, process algebraic and assertional methods have been used primarily to prove properties of untimed (asynchronous) systems; we would also like to use them for timing-based systems. Also, the kinds of properties generally proved using these methods have been \ordinary" safety properties; we would like to use similar methods to also prove timing properties (e.g., upper and lower bounds on time).
In this paper, we describe a candidate for such a model, and use it to express some powerful simulation techniques for proving correctness of timing-based systems. The style of the model we de ne is automata-theoretic, which is the natural style for expressing assertional methods. However, we expect that the model can also serve as a semantic model for interesting algebraic languages, and thus that process algebraic methods can also be employed in the same framework. We de ne several kinds of simulations including re nements, forward simulations, backward simulations, and hybrid versions that we call forward-backward and backward-forward simulations. We prove basic results for these kinds of simulations, in particular, soundness and completeness theorems. We also de ne history relations and prophecy relations, which are abstract versions of the history and prophecy variables of Abadi and Lamport 1] . We prove theorems describing the properties of these various kinds of simulations and relating the di erent kinds of simulations to each other.
The goal of extending simulation techniques to timing-based systems is also the motivation for the work of Lynch and Attiya in 19] . That work, however, only explores forward simulations. Also, the model used in 19] has considerably more structure than the very general model proposed here; it is based closely on the timed automaton model of Merritt, Modugno and Tuttle 22] , which assumes that the system being modeled is describable in terms of a collection of separate tasks, each with associated upper and lower bounds on its speed. This extra structure supports the development of some useful progress measure proof methods, which we do not develop here. On the other hand, the basic theorems about forward simulations that appear in 19] are stated in a setting that has more structure than is really necessary for those theorems. In this paper, we make only those assumptions that are needed for the basic results about simulation proof techniques.
We propose a notion of timed automaton, which is just an automaton (or labeled transition system) equipped with some additional structure. Speci cally, each state of the automaton has an associated time, which indicates the current time. (Thus we use absolute time in the sense of 2] .) The actions of the automaton are of three kinds: visible actions, time-passage actions, and a special internal action . As in many other formalisms for real-time, see for instance 2, 3, 7, 22, 24, 25, 32] , all actions except for the time-passage actions are modeled as occurring instantaneously, i.e., they do not change the time component of the state.
To specify times, we use a dense time domain, speci cally, the nonnegative reals (starting with time 0 in the initial state), and we impose no lower bound on the time between events. This choice distinguishes our work from many others', e.g., 4, 7, 24, 25, 29, 33] , in which discrete time values or universal positive lower bounds on step time are used. Use of real-valued time is less restrictive, and we believe that the extra exibility will be useful in the design and analysis of timing-based distributed algorithms. The penalty we pay for this exibility is that our automata may admit some \Zeno executions", i.e., in nite executions in which the time component is bounded.
Timed automata are required to satisfy a small set of basic axioms which express natural properties of time. For instance, there is an axiom saying that time-passage actions may not decrease time, and another saying that all the other actions are instantaneous.
Also, time can advance by a particular amount in one time-passage step if and only if it can also advance by the same amount in two steps. (This property is called continuity in 32] and, more appropriately, time additivity in 26].) We attempt to use as few axioms as possible to obtain the results about simulations. Later, as we try to express di erent proof methods in terms of this model, we expect to have to add additional requirements to obtain the desired properties. A typical axiom we may have to add at some point is the axiom of time determinism 32, 26] , which says that if from a given state s there are time-passage actions leading to states s 0 and s 00 , which both have the same time, s 0 and s 00 must be equal.
In order to de ne correctness for timed automata, we require notions of external behavior. We emphasize two notions. First, as the nite behaviors of a timed automaton, we take the nite timed traces, each of which consists of a nite sequence of timed external actions together with a nal time. Second, as the in nite behaviors, we take the admissible timed traces, each of which consists of a sequence of timed external actions that can occur in an execution in which the time grows unboundedly (i.e., a \non-Zeno" in nite execution). In a feasible timed automaton, i.e., a timed automaton in which each nite execution can be extended to an execution in which the time is unbounded, the nite timed traces are determined by the admissible ones. For this type of automaton, inclusion of sets of admissible timed traces appears to be a good notion of implementation. One of the main objectives of this paper is to develop proof techniques to show that one automaton implements another in this sense.
Even though our notion of timed automata has less structure than those of 22] and 19], it is closely related to those models. Ours can be regarded as a generalization of the model in 19] , in which the notion of separate tasks is removed. (There are some minor distinctions; for instance, we do not include names for internal actions, but label them all by the special symbol . This distinction is unimportant in a setting without separate tasks.) On the other hand, the model of 22] includes treatment of fairness and liveness, whereas our model does not. (The model in 22] was originally designed as an extension of the non-timing-based input/output automaton model of 20] , which emphasizes the notion of fair execution.) The reason we have not equipped our model with facilities for handling fairness and liveness is that we believe that in the setting of timing-based systems, all properties of practical importance can be expressed as safety properties, given the admissibility assumption that time increases without bound. The absence of fairness and liveness considerations in our model seems to remove various technical and philosophical complications, and to lead to simpler and more systematic proof techniques.
The simulations we consider are derived from simulations studied in many places in the research literature. The simplest kind of simulation we consider is a re nement, which is a functional simulation similar to those studied in 17] and very similar to a homomorphism between automata in the sense of classical automata theory 6]. A re nement from a timed automaton A to another timed automaton B is a time-preserving function from states of A to states of B such that (a) the image of every start state of A is a start state of B, and (b) every step of A has a corresponding sequence of steps of B that begins and ends with the images of the respective beginning and ending states of the given step, and that has the same visible actions. In the untimed setting, it is well known that the corresponding untimed notion of re nement implies an implementation relation between A and B; we give the analogous soundness result, as well as a partial completeness result, for the timed setting.
We then consider forward simulations and backward simulations, which are generalizations of re nements that allow a set of states of B to correspond to a single state of A. Forward simulations are similar to the the simulations of 28, 10] , the possibilities mappings of 20], the downward simulations of 9, 14, 8] , and the forward simulations of 13]. The correspondence conditions (a) and (b) above are generalized so that (a) every start state of A has some image that is a start state of B, and (b) every step of A and every state of B corresponding to the beginning state of the step yield a corresponding sequence of steps of B ending with the image of the ending state of the given step. The usefulness of such simulations in proving correctness in the untimed setting has been well demonstrated. (See, e.g., 18] for some examples.) Again, we give soundness and partial completeness results for the timed setting. Backward simulations occurred rst in 9] under the name of upward simulations and were used later in the setting of CSP in 14, 8] . In 21, 12] it is observed that they are closely related to the prophecy variables rst de ned in 1]. In the case of a backward simulation, conditions (a) and (b) are generalized so that (a) all images of every start state of A are start states of B, and (b) every step of A and every state of B corresponding to the ending state of the step yield a corresponding sequence of steps of B beginning with the image of the beginning state of the given step. Abadi and Lamport 1] demonstrate the usefulness of prophecy variables (and hence backward simulations) in the untimed setting, with some simple examples. Again, we give soundness and partial completeness results for the timed setting.
We also consider forward-backward and backward-forward simulations, which are essentially compositions of one forward and one backward simulation, in the two possible orders. The de nition of a forward-backward simulation has been inspired by the work of Klarlund and Schneider 15] for the untimed setting (with no internal actions) again, we extend these ideas to the timed setting (with internal actions). The notion of a backwardforward simulation is suggested by symmetry with forward-backward simulations. While some of the results for this case are symmetric with the forward-backward case, others (notably, certain completeness results) do not hold.
We also provide rede nitions of the history variable notion of 27] and the prophecy variable notions of 1], in terms of timed automata, and prove equivalence results between these explicit de nitions and our more abstract simulation de nitions.
In order to present our results for timed automata, we nd it convenient rst to describe corresponding results for the simpler untimed setting. Therefore, we rst de ne a simple untimed automaton model corresponding to the timed automaton model, and explore all the types of simulations described above in terms of this model. The de nitions and results for timed automata are given in a subsequent step. The results for the timed setting are completely analogous to those for the untimed setting; in fact, in many cases, our results for the timed setting are derived directly from those for the untimed setting. An advantage of this two-phase approach is that it highlights the adaptability of the various veri cation techniques from the untimed to the timed setting.
As far as the classi cation of simulations is concerned, our work is closely related to and extends that of Jonsson 13] . However, whereas we focus on real-time issues, Jonsson addresses fairness instead. Also, Jonsson has more powerful notion of backward simulation, which we prefer not to use since it fails to reduce global reasoning about in nite behaviors to local reasoning about states and actions.
We consider the main contributions of the paper to be the following. First, we give an organized presentation, in terms of a very simple and abstract model, of a wide range of important simulation techniques, together with their basic soundness and completeness properties. We present the various simulation techniques in a \bottom-up" fashion, starting with simple ones such as forward and backward simulations and building up to more complicated simulations such as forward-backward simulations and history relations. We give elegant and short proofs of soundness and completeness results for complicated simulations in terms of soundness and (partial) completeness results for simple simulations. Second, we introduce the notions of a timed automaton and its behavior, and extend existing simulation notions to this new setting. Third, there are several speci c new de nitions and results, notably: (1) The de nition of a notion of composition of forwardbackward simulations. This allows us to prove that image-nite forward-backward simulations induce a preorder on the domain of general automata. (2) The introduction of backward-forward simulations. Although these simulations do not lead to a complete proof method, they are sound and possibly useful in practice. They arise naturally as the dual notion of forward-backward simulations. (3) The notions of history and prophecy relations. Fourth and nally, our presentation style, which bases the timed case on the untimed case, explains the connections between these two settings.
In what follows, some of the proofs have been omitted because of length restrictions.
Preliminaries

Sequences
Let K be any set. The sets of nite and in nite sequences of elements of K are denoted by K and K ! , respectively. Concatenation of a nite sequence with a nite or in nite sequence is denoted by juxtaposition; denotes the empty sequence and the sequence containing one element a 2 K is denoted a. We say that a sequence is a pre x of a sequence , notation , if either = , or is nite and = 0 for some sequence 0 . A set S of sequences is pre x closed if, whenever some sequence is in S all its pre xes are also. If is a nonempty sequence then rst( ) returns the rst element of , and tail( ) returns with its rst element removed. Moreover, if is nite, then last( ) returns the last element of . If is a sequence over K and L K, then dL denotes the sequence obtained by projecting on L. If S is a set of sequences, SdL is de ned as f dL j 2 Sg.
Sets, Relations and Functions
A relation over sets X and Y is de ned to be any subset of X Y . If f is a relation over X and Y , then we de ne the domain of f to be domain(f ) = fx 2 X j (x; y) 2 f for some y 2 Y g, and the range of f to be range(f ) = fy 2 Y j (x; y) 2 f for some x 2 Xg. A total relation over X and Y is a relation f over X and Y with domain(f ) = X. If X is any set, we let id(X) denote the identity relation over X and X, i.e., f(x; x) j x 2 Xg.
We de ne composition of relations in the usual way, i.e., if f and g are relations over X and Y and over Y and Z, respectively, then g f denotes the relation over X and Z consisting of all pairs (x; z) such that there exists y 2 Y with (x; y) 2 f and (y; z) 2 g. For all relations f, g and h, f (g h) = (f g) h. Also, for X domain(f ) and Y range(f ), id(X) f = f id(Y ) = f. If f is a relation over X and Y , then the inverse of f, written f ?1 , is de ned to be the relation over Y and X consisting of those pairs (y; x) such that (x; y) 2 f. Recall that for any pair of relations f and g, (g 2 X). If X is a set, P(X) denotes the powerset of X, i.e., the set of subsets of X, and PN(X) the set of nonempty subsets of X, i.e., the set P(X) ? f;g. We say that a relation f over X and Y is image-nite if f x] is nite for all x in X. If f is a relation over X and P(Y ), then we say that f is image-2-nite if every set in the range of f is nite.
A Basic Graph Lemma
We require the following lemma, a generalization of K onig's Lemma 16] . If G is a digraph, then a root of G is de ned to be a node with no incoming edges. Lemma 2.1 Let G be an in nite digraph that satis es the following properties.
1. G has nitely many roots. 2. Each node of G has nite outdegree. 3. Each node of G is reachable from some root of G. Then there is an in nite path in G starting from some root.
Proof: The usual proof for K onig's Lemma extends to this case.
Untimed Automata and Their Behaviors
This section presents the basic de nitions and results for untimed automata.
Automata
We begin with the de nition of an (untimed) automaton. An automaton A consists of: a set states(A) of states, a nonempty set start(A) states(A) of start states, a set acts(A) of actions that includes a special element , and a set steps(A) states(A) acts(A) states(A) of steps.
We let s; s 0 ; u; u 0 ,.. range over states, and a,.. over actions. We let ext(A), the external actions, denote acts(A) ? f g. We call the internal action. We use the term event to refer to an occurrence of an action in a sequence. The relation past(A) = after(A) ?1 relates a state s of A to the traces of nite executions of A that lead to s. Also, de ne before(A) to be the relation that relates a nite sequence to those states of A from where an execution with trace is possible. before(A) = f( ; s) j 9 2 frag (A) : trace( ) = and rst( ) = sg:
We write future(A) for before(A) ?1 . 
Trace Properties
For A an automaton, its behavior, beh(A), is de ned by beh(A) = (ext(A); traces(A)). In this subsection, we characterize the structures that can be obtained as the behavior beh(A) for some automaton A as trace properties.
A trace property P is a pair (K; L) with K a set and L a nonempty, pre x closed set of ( nite or in nite) sequences over K. We will refer to the constituents of P as sort(P) and traces(P ), respectively. Also, we write traces (P) = K \ L and traces ! (P) = K ! \ L.
For P and Q trace properties, we de ne P T Q = traces (P) traces (Q), P !T Q = traces ! (P) traces ! (Q), and P T Q = traces(P ) traces(Q). With T , !T and T , we denote the kernels of the preorders T , !T and T , respectively. A trace property P is limit-closed if an in nite sequence is in traces(P ) whenever all its nite pre xes are. Lemma 3.2 Suppose P and Q are trace properties with Q limit-closed. Then P T Q , P T Q. Lemma 3. Figure 1 illustrate the di erence between T and T . Note that automaton B does not have n. We close this subsection with the construction of the canonical automaton for a given trace property.
De nition 3.1 For P a trace property, the associated canonical automaton can(P) is 
Simulations for Untimed Automata
In this section, we develop simulation techniques for untimed automata.
Re nements
The simplest type of simulation we consider is a re nement. A re nement from A to B is a function r from states of A to states of B that satis es the following two conditions: We write A R B if there exists a re nement from A to B.
This notion is similar to that of a homomorphism in classical automata theory; see for instance Ginzberg 6] . Besides our additional treatment of internal actions, a di erence between the two notions is that the classical notion involves a mapping between the action sets of the automata, whereas our re nements do not. The following technical lemma is a straightforward consequence of the de nition of a re nement. Lemma 4.1 Suppose r is a re nement from A to B and s 0 = ) A s. Then r(s 0 ) = ) B r(s). Proposition 4.2 R is a preorder (i.e., is transitive and re exive). Proof: The identity function id(states(A)) is a re nement from A to itself. This implies that R is re exive. Using Lemma 4.1, transitivity follows from the observation that if r is a re nement from A to B and r 0 is a re nement from B to C, r 0 r is a re nement from A to C. Proof: The relation f = after(B) past(A) is a forward simulation from A to B.
Backward Simulations
In many respects, backward simulations are the dual of forward simulations. Whereas a forward simulation requires that some state in the image of each start state should be a start state, a backward simulation requires that all states in the image of a start state be start states. Also, a forward simulation requires that forward steps in the source automaton can be simulated from related states in the target automaton, whereas the corresponding condition for a backward simulations requires that backward steps can be simulated. However, the two notions are not completely dual: the de nition of a backward simulation contains a nonemptiness condition, and also, in order to imply soundness in general, backward simulations also require a nite image condition. The mismatch is due to the asymmetry in our automata between future and past: from any given state, all the possible histories are nite executions, whereas the possible futures can be in nite.
A backward simulation from A to B is a total relation b over states(A) and states(B) that satis es: Hence, 2 traces(B).
In a recent paper, Jonsson 13 ] considers a weaker image-niteness condition for backward simulations. Translated into our setting, the key observation of Jonsson is that in order to prove A T B, it is enough to give a backward simulation b from A to B with the property that each in nite execution of A contains in nitely many states s with b s] nite. We do not explore this extension in this paper, primarily because it lacks a key feature of simulation techniques. Namely, it fails to reduce global reasoning about in nite behaviors to local reasoning about states and actions.
The following partial completeness result slightly generalizes a similar result of Jonsson 12] in that it also alllows for -steps in the B automaton. Proof: Let C = can(beh(A)). By Lemma 3.6, C is a deterministic forest and A T C.
Since C is deterministic, A F C by Theorem 4.9, and because C is a forest, C B B follows by Theorem 4.14(1). If B has n then C iB B follows by Theorem 4.14(2).
Forward-Backward and Backward-Forward Simulations
Forward-Backward Simulations
Forward-backward simulations were introduced by Klarlund and Schneider 15] who call them invariants. They also occur in the work of Jonsson 13] under the name subset simulations, and are related to the failure simulations of Gerth 5] . Forward-backward simulations combine in a single relation both a forward and a backward simulation. Below we present simple proofs of their soundness and completeness by making this connection explicit.
Formally states(C ) = range(g), start(C ) = range(g) \ P(start(B)), acts(C ) = acts(B), and for S 0 ; S 2 states(C ) and a 2 acts(C ), S 0 a ?! C S , 8u 2 S 9u 0 2 S 0 : u 0â = ) B u. Then g is a forward simulation from A to C. Also, f(S; u) j S 2 states(C ) and u 2 Sg is a backward simulation from C to B, which is image nite if g is image-2-nite.
In order to show that FB and iFB are preorders, we require a de nition of composition for forward-backward simulations, and a transitivity lemma.
De nition 4.1 If g is a relation over X and PN(Y ) and g 0 is a relation over Y and PN(Z) then the composition g 0 g is a relation over X and PN(Z) de ned as follows.
(x; S 0 ) 2 g 0 g , 9S 2 g x]; 9c; a choice function for g 0 dS : S 0 = fc(y) : y 2 Sg:
(The nonemptiness assumptions for g and g 0 immediately imply the nonemptiness assumption for g 0 g.) Lemma 4.20 Suppose g is a forward-backward simulation from A to B, and g 0 is a forward-backward simulation from B to C. Then g 0 g is a forward-backward simulation from A to C. Moreover, if g and g 0 are image-2-nite then g 0 g is also image-2-nite. 
Backward-Forward Simulations
Having studied forward-backward simulations, we nd it natural to de ne and study a dual notion of backward-formulation simulation.
A backward-forward simulation from A to B is a total relation g over states(A) and states(C ) = range(g), start(C ) = range(gdstart(A)), acts(C ) = acts(B), and for S 0 ; S 2 states(C ) and a 2 acts(C ), S 0 a ?! C S , 8u 0 2 S 0 9u 2 S : u 0â = ) B u.
Then g is a backward simulation from A to C (and image-niteness carries over). Also, the relation f(S; u) j S 2 states(C ) and u 2 Sg is a forward simulation from C to B.
In order to show the properties of backward-forward simulations, it is useful to relate them to forward-backward simulations. We claim that the relation g given by g 0] = ff0g; f0 0 ; 1g; f0 0 ; 1 0 ; 2g; : : :g g n] = ff!g; f! 0 gg for n > 0 is an image-nite forward-backward simulation from I to J.
However, there is no image-nite backward-forward simulation from I to J. We see this as follows. Suppose g is an image-nite backward-forward simulation from I to J. In order to prove that this assumption leads to a contradiction, we rst establish that g 0] does not contain a nite subset X of N. First note that by the rst condition in the de nition of a backward-forward simulation, all sets in g 0] are nonempty. The proof proceeds by induction on the maximal element of X. For the induction base, observe that f0g 6 2 g 0], since 0 has an incoming 0-step in I but not in J. For the induction step, suppose that we have established that g 0] contains no nite subset of N with a maximum less than n, and suppose X 2 g 0] with X a nite subset of N with maximum n. Using that 0 has an incoming 0-step in I, the second condition in the de nition of a backward-forward simulation gives that g 0] contains an element of g 0] which is a subset of N with a maximum less than n. This contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Pick some state n > 0 of I and a set S 0 2 g n]. Since 0 n ?! I n, there exists a set S 2 g 0] such that every state in S has an outgoing n-step. Then S must be a subset of f0; : : : ; n ? 1; (n ? 1) 0 g. Since g 0] does not contain the empty set or a nite subset of N, it follows that (n ? 1) 0 2 S. But since n was chosen arbitrarily (besides being positive) it follows that g 0] has an in nite number of elements. This gives a contradiction with the assumption that g is image-nite. 
Auxiliary Variable Constructions
In this subsection, we present two new types of relations, history relations and prophecy relations, which correspond to the notions of history variable and prophecy variable of Abadi and Lamport 1]. We show that there exists a close connection between history relations and forward simulations, and also between prophecy relations and backward simulations. Using these connections together with the earlier results of this section, we can easily derive a completeness theorem for re nements similar to the one of Abadi and Lamport 1]. In fact, in the setting of this paper the combination of history and prophecy relations and re nements gives exactly the same veri cation power as the combination of forward and backward simulations.
History Relations
A relation h over states(A) and states(B) is a history relation from A to B if h is a forward simulation from A to B and h ?1 is a re nement from B to A. We write A H B if there exists a history relation from A to B.
We give an example of a history relation, using the construction of the \unfolding" of an automaton; the unfolding of an automaton augments the automaton by remembering information about the past.
De nition 4.2 The unfolding of an automaton A, notation unfold(A), is the automaton B Proof: Let h be a history relation from A to B. De ne automaton C by states(C ) = h, (s; u) 2 start(C ) , u 2 start(B), acts(C ) = acts(B), and for (s 0 ; u 0 ); (s; u) 2 states(C ) and a 2 acts(C ), (s 0 ; u 0 ) a ?! C (s; u) , u 0 a ?! B u.
Clearly, the projection function 2 that maps a state (s; u) of C to the state u of B is an isomorphism between C and B.
In order to show that C is obtained from A by adding a history variable, let states(B) play the role of the set V required in the de nition of a history variable. It is easy to check that relation f(s; (s; v)) j (s; v) 2 states(C )g is a history relation from A to C. Proposition 4.33 shows that history relations already capture the essence of history variables. For this reason and also because history relations have nicer theoretical properties, we will state all our results in this subsection in terms of relations, and will not mention the auxiliary variables any further. 
Prophecy Relations
Now we will present prophecy relations and show that they correspond to backward simulations, very similarly to the way in which history relations correspond to forward simulations.
A relation p over states(A) and states(B) is a prophecy relation from A to B if p is a backward simulation from A to B and p ?1 is a re nement from B to A. We write A P B if there exists a prophecy relation from A to B, and A iP B if there is an image-nite prophecy relation from A to B. We give an example of a prophecy relation, using the construction of the \guess" of an automaton. This construction is a kind of dual to the unfolding construction of the previous subsection in that the states contain information about the future rather than about the past.
De nition 4. 
Timed Automata and Their Behaviors
This section presents the basic de nitions and results for timed automata. The development is generally parallel to that in Section 3.
Timed Automata
A timed automaton A is an automaton whose set of actions is a superset of f g R 0 , and whose step relation satis es a number of axioms that will be presented below. In the rest of this paper, A; B; : : : will range over timed automata. Suppose is an execution fragment of A. Then :ftime denotes the time component of the rst state in , and :ltime denotes the smallest element of R 0 f1g larger or equal than (i.e., the supremum of) the time components of all states in . In particular, if is an execution, then :ftime = 0, and if is a nite execution fragment, then :ltime = last( ):time.
Admissible Executions and Feasibility
Timed automata do not include any features for describing liveness or fairness (such as the class structure of I/O automata). We believe that such features are not so important in the timed setting as they are in the untimed setting. In fact, we think that by simply requiring that time grow unboundedly in in nite executions, we will be able to handle the liveness properties that arise in practice. Thus, in our study of timed automata, we concentrate on the admissible executions and execution fragments, i.e., those in which the time components of the states increase without bound. So is an admissible execution fragment i :ltime = 1.
The notion of an admissible execution is more tractable mathematically than the notion of a fair execution in the I/O automaton model; this is because the admissible executions of a timed automaton are exactly the limits of the in nite sequences of nite executions, where each execution in the sequence is a pre x of the next and the time components of the states go to 1. This characterization permits the reduction of questions about in nite behaviors to questions about nite behaviors. A similar reduction is not possible in untimed models that incorporate fairness.
The idea behind the notion of admissible executions is that time is an independent force, beyond the control of any automaton, which happens to grow unboundedly. We note that, according to our de nitions, there are timed automata in which from some (or even all) states no admissible execution fragment is possible. This can either be because from these states onwards time cannot advance at all (that is, a time deadlock occurs), or because time can continue advancing, but not beyond a certain point (that is, all executions are so-called Zeno executions). The possibility of time deadlocks occurs in several process algebraic models ( 2, 7, 24]) but we have no intuition whatsoever about what it means to \stop time". Zeno executions arise due to the inability of automaton models to deal with an in nite amount of activity within a bounded period of time. Some models of real-time computation, for instance the model of real-time CSP 29], exclude Zeno executions altogether. As a result of our attempt to make our results as general as possible, our model does allow for both time deadlocks and Zeno executions. However, in several of our theorems we will require that the automata be feasible. A timed automaton A is feasible provided that each nite execution is a pre x of some admissible execution. Thus, a feasible timed automaton does not have time deadlocks, but may have Zeno executions.
Timed Traces
The traces of timed automata do not provide a su ciently abstract view of their behavior, because they do not re ect the invisible nature of time-passage actions. We illustrate this via the following key example. Although Idle 0 T Idle, it is not the case that Idle T Idle 0 . This is because Idle has a trace consisting of 38 only, which Idle 0 does not have. (Note that Idle 0 does have a trace 37 38.) So if we would use T as an implementation relation it would not be allowed to implement a speci cation that only requires an internal (unobservable) step at time 37 by a device that does nothing at all. It is for this reason that we consider T not to be a good implementation relation.
In this subsection, we de ne an alternative notion of external behavior for timed automata that does not include explicit individual time-passage actions. We describe the external behavior of timed automata in terms of observations that we call timed traces; these contain information about the visible actions that occur, together with their time of occurrence, and also about the nal time up to which the observation is made. Along the way to the de nition of a timed trace, it is helpful to de ne the basic notion of a timed sequence pair.
Timed Sequence Pairs
A timed sequence over a given set K is de ned to be a ( nite or in nite) sequence over K R 0 in which the time components are nondecreasing, i.e., t t 0 if (k; t) and (k 0 ; t 0 ) are consecutive elements in . We say that is Zeno if it is in nite and the limit of the time components is nite.
A timed sequence pair over K is a pair p = ( ; t), where is a timed sequence over Lemma 5.1 is a partial ordering on timed sequence pairs over K. 
Timed Traces of Timed Automata
A timed trace of A is the timed trace of some nite or admissible execution of A. We write t-traces(A) for the set of all timed traces of A, t-traces (A) for the set of nite timed traces, i.e., those that originate from a nite execution of A, and t-traces 1 (A) for the admissible timed traces, i.e., those that originate from an admissible execution of A. The following proposition is a direct consequence of the de nitions. 
From Traces to Timed Traces
A trace preserves more information about an execution than a timed trace. Below we show how the timed trace of an execution fragment can be reconstructed from its starting time and its trace. This reconstruction will allow us to relate the untimed and the timed trace preorders. Let K be some set with R 0 K, and let = a 1 a 2 a 3 be a sequence over K. We say is monotonic if the time-passage events contained in it increase monotonically, i.e., for all i < j, a i ; a j 2 R 0 ) a i a j . Clearly, each trace of a timed automaton A is a monotonic sequence over ext(A). Let = a 1 a 2 a 3 be monotonic sequence over K, and let t 2 R 0 be less than or equal to all time-passage events in . We de ne a timed sequence pair t-pair(t; ) in two steps. First, de ne for i 2 N, t i 2 R 0 inductively by: t 0 = t and if a i 2 R 0 then t i+1 = a i else t i+1 = t i . Let be the sequence (a 1 ; t 1 )(a 2 ; t 2 )(a 3 ; t 3 ) , and let t 0 be the supremum, in R 0 f1g, of all the t i 's. 
Restricted Kinds of Timed Automata
A has t-nite invisible nondeterminism (t-n) if start(A) is nite, and for any state s 0 and any nite timed sequence pair p over vis(A), there are only nitely many states s such that s 0 p ; A s. Example 5.2 In order to illustrate the di erence between n and t-n we de ne a timed automaton Idle 00 . Basically, automaton Idle 00 does nothing except that it lets time pass. However, at one nondeterministically chosen time t > 0, Idle 00 makes a -step, and then it subsequently remembers t. Formally, Idle 00 is de ned as follows:
states ( By induction on the length of the sequence of time-passage actions one can easily establish that Idle 00 has n. However, Idle 00 does not have t-n since for any t 2 R + all the states from the uncountable set f(t; t 0 )j0 < t 0 tg can be reached with timed sequence pair ( ; t) from the initial state.
The requirement that a timed automaton be a forest is not a very interesting one because if a state has one incoming time-passage step from a state with a smaller time component, then it must have an in nite number of them (as a consequence of axiom T3) so that the timed automaton cannot be a forest. Now a forest is characterized by the property that for each state there is a unique execution that leads to it. In analogy we will de ne below the notion of a t-forest. This is a timed automaton with the property that for each state there is an execution that leads to it, which is unique \modulo" axioms T1, T2 and T3.
Call a nite execution fragment of A fat if it contains no idling steps and no pair of consecutive time-passage steps. Then A is de ned to be a t-forest if for each state of A there is a unique fat execution that leads to it. The following lemma gives a su cient condition for a timed automaton to be a t-forest. Proof: Suppose A satis es the conditions of the lemma. Because all states of A are reachable we know that for each state s there is at least one execution that leads to it. Since we can remove idling steps from an execution, and since by repeated application of axiom T2 we can contract successive time-passage steps, there is at least one fat execution that leads to s. In order to show uniqueness, suppose that A has two fat executions, and 0 that lead to s. By induction on the sum of the lengths of and 0 , using the fact that A is a t-forest, we prove that = 0 . If consists of state s only, then so does 0 , and vice versa. We see this as follows. If consists of s only, then s is a start state. Because A is a t-forest, there are no incoming non-idling steps to s. But loss of generality, we may assume that the former holds. Now consider the execution 00 = t 0 r 0 . Since is fat, 00 must be fat too. Thus 00 and 0 are two fat executions leading to r 0 , and by induction hypothesis we obtain 00 = 0 . But since 00 ends with a time-passage step, this means that 0 ends with two time-passage steps, which is in contradiction with the fact that this execution is fat.
Thus we have shown that for each state of A there is a unique fat execution that leads to it, which means that A is a t-forest.
Suppose A is a timed automaton. In analogy with the untimed case, the relation t-after(A) consists of those pairs (p; s) 2 tsp(vis(A)) states(A) for which there is a nite execution of A with timed trace p and last state s. t-after(A) = f(p; s) j 9 2 execs (A) : t-trace( ) = p and last( ) = sg:
The relation t-past(A) = t-after(A) ?1 relates a state s of A to the timed traces of executions that lead to s. Also, de ne t-before(A) to be the relation that relates a timed sequence pair p to those states of A from where an execution with timed trace p is possible.
t-before(A) = f(p; s) j 9 2 frag (A) : t-trace( ) = p and rst( ) = sg:
We write t-future(A) for t-before(A) ?1 .
Lemma 5.8
1. If A is deterministic then t-after(A) is a function from t-traces (A) to states(A). By induction on the sum of the lengths of and 0 we prove that s = s 0 . If consists of state s only, then s is the unique start state of A and therefore also the rst state of 0 . As noted above, 0 does not contain events. Moreover, 0 does not contain any events in ext(A) because that would violate the condition that t-trace( ) = t-trace( 0 ). Thus 0 contains no events at all and consists of state s only. But this implies s = s 0 , as required. By a symmetric argument it also follows that s = s 0 if we start from the assumption that 0 consists of s 0 only. Now suppose = as and 0 = 0 a 0 s 0 , with last( ) = r and last( 0 ) = r 0 . Let t = r:time and t 0 = r 0 :time. Since a and a 0 are either time-passage actions or visible actions, and and 0 have the same timed trace and end at the same time, it cannot be that one of a and a 0 is an external action and the other is a time-passage action. In fact, it must be the case that a = a 0 . If t = t 0 , then t-trace( ) = t-trace( 0 ). This means we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain r = r 0 . Then in combination with the fact that A is deterministic, this gives s = s 0 . Otherwise, we can assume without loss of generality that t < t 0 . (The other case is symmetric.) In this case, it must be that a and a 0 are both time-passage actions, and so t 0 < s:time. By axiom T2, there is an r 00 such that r t 0 ?! r 00 and r 00s:time ?! s. Since t-trace( t 0 r 00 ) = t-trace( 0 ), we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain r 00 = r 0 . Now s = s 0 follows by the fact that A is deterministic.
Parts 2 is immediate from the de nitions. For 3, suppose that A is a t-forest. Because all states of A are reachable we know that for each state s of A, t-past(A) s] contains at least one element. Suppose that both p and p 0 are in t-past(A) s] for some s 2 states(A). Then there are nite executions and 0 of A with t-trace( ) = p, t-trace( 0 ) = p 0 and last( ) = last( 0 ) = s. Without loss of generality we can assume that both and 0 are fat, since we can always remove idling steps, and by repeatedly applying axiom T1 we can eliminate successive timepassage steps, and this does not in uence the timed traces of the executions. But now the assumption that A is a t-forest gives = 0 . This immediately implies p = p 0 .
Timed Trace Properties
For each timed automaton A, its timed behavior, t-beh(A), is de ned by t-beh(A) = (vis(A); t-traces(A)). Completely analogous to the way in which we characterized, in Section 3.3, the behaviors of automata in terms of trace properties, we will now characterize the timed behaviors of timed automata in terms of timed trace properties.
A set of timed sequence pairs is pre x closed if, whenever a timed sequence pair is in the set all its pre xes are also. A timed trace property P is a pair (K; L) where K is a set and L is a nonempty, pre x closed set of nite and admissible timed sequence pairs over K. We will refer to the constituents of P as sort(P) and t-traces(P), respectively. Also, we write t-traces (P) for the set of nite timed sequence pairs in t-traces(P), and t-traces 1 (P) for the set of admissible timed sequence pairs in t-traces(P). For P and Q timed trace properties, we de ne P Proof: We sketch the proof of 2; it is analogous to that of Lemma 3.3. Suppose A has t-n and p 1 p 2 : : : is an in nite chain of timed sequence pairs in t-traces (A) such that the limits of the time components of the p i 's is 1. (t 0 ; n; m) t ?! (t; n; m) if t 0 = t _ (t 0 < t n); (t; n; m) a ?! (t; n + 1; m) if t = n < m:
One can check that TA t T TB but TA 6 t T TB. In order to see that the feasibility condition in Proposition 5.12 (2) Our aim is to develop proof techniques for showing inclusion between the sets of timed traces of timed automata. In order to do this, we show how this problem can be reduced to the problem of proving inclusion between the sets of traces of certain derived automata. This reduction solves our problem, in a sense, since it allows us to use the various simulation techniques in Section 4 to prove inclusion results for timed automata. The approach is analogous to that followed for Milner's CCS 23] where the problem of deciding weak observation equivalence is reduced to the problem of deciding strong bisimulation. A key role in our reduction is played by the construction of the closure of a timed automaton.
t-Closed Timed Automata
In the previous section we have shown that for timed automata the traces contain (in general) more information than the timed traces. That is, from the traces of a timed automaton we can retrieve the timed traces (Lemma 5.4), but the reverse is not always possible (Example 5.1). However, there exist certain classes of timed automata for which the traces can be retrieved from the timed traces. In this subsection, we will identify one such a class, namely the t-closed timed automata.
A timed automaton A is said to be t-closed provided that it satis es the following closure condition: In order to show that the ( nite) traces of a t-closed timed automaton can be retrieved from its ( nite) timed traces, we proceed in two steps. First we de ne an operation prune that associates to each montonic sequence a normal form. We then show (Lemma 6.1) that a sequence is a trace of a t-closed automaton if and only if its normal form is. Next, we de ne an operation monot that takes a timed sequence pair and transforms it into a monotonic sequence in normal form. We show (Lemma 6.2) that prune is nothing but the composition of t-pair, which takes a trace to a timed trace, and monot. In the same lemma we also prove that if p is a timed trace of a t-closed automaton, monot(p) is a trace of that automaton. From these results it follows that traces (A) can be retrieved from t-traces (A): traces (A) consists of all the monotonic sequences whose normal form equals monot(p) for some timed trace p of A.
Let be a nite monotonic sequence over some set K, and let t 2 R 0 be less than or equal to all time-passage actions in . Then prune(t; ) is the monotonic sequence obtained from by (1) removing all time-passage events that are either t or preceded (not necessarily directly) by a time-passage event with the same value, and (2) removing all time-passage events that are immediately followed by a time-passage event with a higher value. We write prune( ) for prune(0 ; ). and let p = ((a 1 ; t 1 ) (a n ; t n ); t n+1 ) be a nite timed sequence pair over K with t p:ftime. Then the monotonic sequence monot(t; p) is obtained by taking the sequence t 1 a 1 t n a n t n+1 and removing from it all t i events that are either t or preceded by an event t j that has the same value. We write monot(p) for monot(0 ; p). Lemma 6.2 1. Suppose t 2 R 0 and is a nite monotonic sequence with t less or equal than all time-passage actions in . Then prune(t; ) = monot(t; t-pair(t; )). The converse direction follows from Lemma 5.6.
We also have the following property involving n. 
Closure of a Timed Automaton
In this subsection, we give a useful construction to extend an arbitrary timed automaton to a t-closed timed automaton.
Let A be a timed automaton. The closure of A, denoted by cl(A), is the structure B which is exactly the same as A, except that the relation steps(A) is augmented by closing it under the closure condition given in T4 (simultaneously with T2 to let the result be a timed automaton again). 
Lemma 6.6
A relation h over states(A) and states(B) is a timed history relation from A to B if it is a timed forward simulation from A to B and h ?1 is a timed re nement from B to A.
A relation p over states(A) and states(B) is a timed prophecy relation from A to B if it is a timed backward simulation from A to B and p ?1 is a timed re nement from B to A.
We write A Obviously, all the timed versions of re nements, forward simulations, etc., that we de ned above are synchronous. The following observation is more interesting. Note that in the proof below the idling steps play a key role. In fact, the result would not be correct without them. Lemma 6.11 Proof: For 
Relating Timed and Untimed Simulations
In Section 6.2, we showed that (under certain niteness conditions) there is a one-toone correspondence between inclusion of timed traces on the level of timed automata, and inclusion of traces between the closures of these automata. In this subsection we observe that there is also a strong connection between timed simulations between timed automata, and the same functions viewed as untimed simulations between the closures of these automata. As an immediate consequence of this observation we obtain easy soundness proofs for all the timed simulations of Section 6.3, since soundness of the timed simulations reduces to the soundness of the corresponding untimed simulations. Moreover we obtain \for free" a completeness result for timed forward-backward simulations. it is a re nement from cl(A) to cl(B). Moreover, the above property also holds if both occurrences of the word \re nement" are replaced by \forward simulation", \backward simulation", \forward-backward simulation", \backward-forward simulation", \history relation" or \prophecy relation".
Proof: Here we prove the case of re nements. The other mappings can be handled similarly.
Suppose r is a timed re nement from A to B. We have to show that r is a re nement from cl(A) to cl(B), and the only thing nontrivial here is to demonstrate that r satsi es the second clause from the de nition of a re nement. For the other direction, suppose r is a re nement from cl(A) to cl(B). We have to establish that r is a timed re nement from A to B, and for this again the only nontrivial part is the second clause in the de nition of a timed re nement. So suppose s 0 a ?! A s. Proof: Note that except for the superscripts t, Figure 6 is the same as Figure 5 , which gives an overview of the relationships in the untimed case. Using Corollary 6.14 and Lemmas 6.7 and 6.8, the \thin line" inclusions for the timed case follow from the corresponding inclusions for the untimed case. For the \thick" line inclusions one needs in addition Lemmas 6.6 and 6.9.
In order to show that all the inclusions are strict, one can basically just use the same counterexamples as in the untimed setting. In order to turn the untimed automata into timed automata one only has to attach a 0-loop to each state. Only for establishing the di erence between Here are two more results that carry over because of the correspondence between the timed and the untimed case. Proof: From the de nition of the closure construction it is immediate that all states of cl(A) are reachable. By Lemma 6.6(2), cl(B) has n, and by Lemma 6.13, cl(A) B cl(B). Now we can apply Proposition 4.15, the untimed version of the fact we are proving, to obtain cl(A) iB cl(B). By Lemma 6.11 any backward simulation is synchronous, which means that we can apply Lemma 6.13 in the other direction to conclude A
